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Chapter 11 
 
Preaching and Christianisation: Communication, Cognition and Audience Reception 
 
Isabella Sandwell 
 
Recent decades have seen a proliferation of interest in the preaching of John 
Chrysostom. Scholars have explored the relationship between the written sermons and 
the words Chrysostom might actually have spoken, the make-up of Chrysostom’s 
audiences, the physical spaces and liturgical context in which Chrysostom’s sermon s 
were delivered, the rhetorical skill of the preacher and the way he sought to persuade 
his audiences.1  What is less often recognised is that these issues are important because 
they help us understand the role that late-antique preaching had in facilitating the 
transition from a Graeco-Roman to a Christian society by disseminating the Christian 
message to ordinary populations of the towns and cities of the Roman World. At the 
same time, the whole field of the study of John Chrysostom’s preaching has been under-
theorised. Scholars have focused on placing Chrysostom’s words in the context of the 
ancient rhetorical and exegetical theory that he himself would have used without 
realising that this can only tell us how far Chrysostom meets the criteria for successful 
communication laid out by ancient thinkers. There is no external criterion of judgement, 
no recognition that assessing Chrysostom by the very terms he has set will always be 
circular, and thus that such approaches have little real explanatory power. In this 
chapter I want to suggest that relating Chrysostom’s preaching to modern 
communication theory and to recent developments in cognitive science, which explore 
very pertinent questions of how people comprehend verbal discourse and how 
knowledge is transmitted among human populations, can help us out of this circular 
loop and provide a new way to assess how successful Chrysostom’s preaching was, and 
why.2 I will set out the basic principles of these approaches, use them to critique 
previous scholarship on Chrysostom, and, finally, suggest some ways forward. 
 
1 What Counts as Good Communication? Dialogue Versus Mass Communication  
 
One of the main problems with existing scholarship on Chrysostom is that it 
misunderstands what counts as good communication and assumes that dialogic modes 
of communication, often influenced by Plato, are the ideal to which Chrysostom’s 
preaching should be compared.  Modern communication theory does not always share 
 
1 Jaclyn L. Maxwell, Christianization and Communication in Late Antiquity: John Chrysostom and his 
Congregation in Antioch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 65–87; Wendy Mayer, “Who 
Came to Hear John Chrysostom Preach? Recovering a Late Fourth-Century Preacher’s Audience,” 
Ephemerides Theologicae 76 (2000): 73–87; ead., The Homilies of St John Chrysostom—Provenance, 
Reshaping the Foundations, OCA 273 (Rome: Pontificio Istituto Orientale, 2005); ead., “John Chrysostom: 
Extraordinary Preacher, Ordinary Audience,” in Preacher and Audience: Studies in Early Christian and 
Byzantine Homiletic, eds. Mary B. Cunningham and Pauline Allen (Leiden: Brill, 1998), 103–37; ead., “The 
Dynamics of Liturgical Space: Aspects of Interaction between St John Chrysostom and his Audiences,” 
Ephemerides Liturgicae 111 (1997): 108. 
2 Doron Mendels, The Media Revolution of Early Christianity: An Essay on Eusebius’ Ecclesiastical History 
(Grand Rapids Mich.: William B. Eerdmans, 1999) has used modern communication theory, particularly 
modern media performance theory, to understand Eusebius of Caesarea’s historical writing, but my goals 
in using communication theory are rather different. For me, such theories offer a way to critique the 
assumptions people have made about preaching as a mode of communication.  
  
 
this overly positive view of dialogue. In particular, John Peters in his Speaking into Air: 
A History of the Idea of Communication challenges the way that dialogue has been 
idealised from the time of Plato to the present day due to its associations with 
democracy and reciprocal exchange.3 For Peters, Plato’s Socratic dialogues are a prime 
example of this mistaken ideal of communication.4 He argues that Plato’s Phaedrus 
presents dialogue as a kind of erotic relationship “that links lover and beloved in a 
reciprocal flow.”5 In this model, communication is “one-on-one, interactive, live and 
unique, non-reproducable” and also “sender orientated.”6 Despite the seeming 
reciprocity of dialogue, the real aim is to make the interlocutor think like the main 
speaker. As Peters puts it “the question for him [Plato] is the care of the seeds [words] 
not what the recipient might add to the process.”7 The main speaker in the dialogue can 
control how the other parties receive what he or she says precisely because they share 
culture and education and are bound closely to one another. There is to be no room for 
misunderstanding or divergent interpretations; rather, the goal is the recreation of one 
person’s thoughts “faithfully in the mind of another,” to make others think like you do, 
to elide the differences between self and other and to allow for a “sharing of minds.”8 
Peters also argues that Plato’s critique of writing can be seen as a critique of mass 
communication because for him the latter amounts to an “indiscriminate scatter” of 
words “on those who will not know what to do with them.”9 Thus, Peters argues that for 
Plato any form of mass communication that does take place should mimic as far as 
possible the conditions of dialogue with the speaker, carefully adjusting what he or she 
says to the listener to allow as little as possible room for misunderstanding.10 As Peters 
puts it: 
 
Indiscriminate dissemination is bad; intimate dialogue or prudent rhetoric that 
matches message and receiver is good. Speeches not appropriate to their audience 
can bring dangerous harvest… Socrates thus conceives of mass communication as 
a kind of dialogue writ large. No stray messages, furtive listeners or unintended 
effects are allowed.11  
 
Peters’ view is that this model of dialogic communication is both flawed and doomed to 
failure. It is flawed because it is authoritarian in its desire to erase the other and 
recreate them and their thoughts in the image of the speaker. It is doomed to failure 
 
3 John Durham Peters, Speaking into Air: A History of the Idea of Communication (Chicago–London: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1999), chapter 1, esp. 33.  
4 For accounts of Platonic dialogue that, as Simon Goldhill (ed., The End of Dialogue in Antiquity 
[Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008], 3,) puts it, recognise “the tensions in Platonic writing 
between the drive towards ideal, normative, authoritative knowledge and the slipperiness and 
playfulness of dialogue as a means of expression,” see, for example, Alex Long, “Plato’s Dialogues and A 
Common Rationale for Dialogue Form,” in ibid., 29–44 (with further bibliography).  
5 Peters, Speaking into Air, 35. 
6 Peters, Speaking into Air, 35; also 48. Peters bases his argument here on Jacques Derrida’s analysis of 
the Phaedrus in his Dissemination, trans. Barbara Johnson (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), 
149. 
7 Peters, Speaking into Air, 35. 
8 Peters, Speaking into Air, 20–21, 29 and 31.  
9 Peters, Speaking into Air, 46, referring to Phaedrus, 276a. 
10 Peters, Speaking into Air, 37–8. 
11 Peters, Speaking into Air, 46, referring to Phaedrus, 276a. 
  
 
because the nature of language and human minds means we can never make people 
think like we do.12  
Instead, Peters proposes that we undertake a re-evaluation of mass-
communication that recognises that it represents a more realistic and more democratic 
model for how communication works than dialogue, precisely because it is a “receiver 
oriented model in which the sender has no control over the harvest.”13 He presents 
Jesus’ preaching, as represented in the parable of the sower, as an example of the ideal 
of mass communication because Jesus does not try to adjust his message to suit the 
listeners, but lets them interpret what he says in their own varied and idiosyncratic 
ways.14 For Peters, this is a “parable about the diversity of audience interpretations in 
settings that lack direct interaction” and “when sender and receiver, sower and eventual 
harvest, are loosely coupled.”15 Jesus’ exoteric, “asymetrical and public” mode of 
communication can thus be contrasted to Plato’s/Socrates’ esoteric, “reciprocal and 
hermetic” mode.16 According to this alternate model, communication is characterised 
precisely by imperfect transmission from one mind to the next. As Peters says, “the gap 
between encoding and decoding,” which allows audiences “to find meanings wildly 
divergent from those intended by the speaker,…may well be the mark of all 
communication.”17 These characteristics of communication, however, do not mean 
giving up on it altogether, or seeing it as pointless. Rather, as Peters puts it, we need to 
accept that true communication “erases neither the curious fact of otherness at its core 
nor the possibility of doing things through words” (my emphasis).18  
Peters’ work can provide us with a way to critique previous approaches to 
Chrysostom’s homilies that uphold dialogue as the ideal model of communication and 
assess Chrysostom’s preaching according to this ideal, either shoehorning it into the 
model of dialogue, or seeing it as a form of mass-communication to which Chrysostom 
and other late-antique preachers only resorted because the necessary conditions for 
true dialogue no longer existed. Perhaps surprisingly, the former view has been the 
more dominant in Chrysostom scholarship. The clearest statement of this view can be 
found in a short chapter on scriptural preaching by Carol Harrison.19 In her exploration 
of how Christian preachers “imprinted” Scripture on the “hearts of the congregation” in 
order “to form, conform and reform the minds and hearts of their listeners to the word 
of God,” she argues that late-antique preachers like Chrysostom were only able to have 
 
12 Peters, Speaking into Air, 21–22, 29, 31 and 52. 
13 Peters, Speaking into Air, 35. Peter’s work is part of a larger re-evaluation of mass communication after 
it was abandoned by cultural studies departments in the 1990s because of its associations with 
totalitarianism and propaganda and because of the development of new media such as the internet. See 
Peter Simonson, Refiguring Mass Communication: A History (Urbana–Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 
2010). Simonson’s positive re-evaluation of mass communication takes a different stance from Peters’ but 
he also critiques some of the negative associations of mass communications (Simonson, Refiguring, 19–
20). For the different ways mass communication can be defined, see Simonson, Refiguring, 6 and 20–23). 
For a history of the terms “mass communication,” see Simonson, Refiguring, chapter one. 
14 Peters, Speaking into Air, 35 and 51–61.  See also Stuart Hall, “Encoding/Decoding,” in Culture, Media, 
Language: Working Papers in Cultural Studies, 1972–1979, ed. Stuart Hall et al. (London: Hutchinson, 
1980), 129. 
15 Peters, Speaking into Air, 51. 
16 Peters, Speaking into Air, 53–54. 
17 Peters, Speaking into Air, 52 and 29. See also 59, 61, 66 and 22. 
18 Peters, Speaking into Air, 21. 
19 Carol Harrison, “The Typology of Listening: The Transformation of Scripture in Early Christian 
Preaching,” in Delivering the Word: Preaching and Exegesis in the Western Christian Tradition, ed. 
William John Lyons and Isabella Sandwell (Sheffield: Equinox, 2012). 
  
 
an impact on their audiences because they already shared Christian values, teachings 
and knowledge with them.20 As she says, 
 
both preacher and congregation brought to their conversation minds which were 
already, to a large extent, shaped and moulded by their faith, their Christian lives, 
and their previous exposure to Christian teaching and catechesis on the basis of 
scripture (as well as to secular, pagan culture).  They hopefully inhabited a shared 
thought world of presuppositions and expectations—of all the tacit markers of 
Christian faith and culture—which enabled what was said to be understood, 
assimilated, and to take effect in confirming—or if need be—reforming, the image 
of God which they already carried in their souls.21  
 
For Harrison, sermons are one side of a conversation in which much could be left unsaid 
because the audience shared with their preacher a “complicit understanding, common 
memory, or ‘symbol-system.’”22 As she says, 
 
the preacher knows his congregation, cares for them as a parent does their child, 
loves them as a lover loves their beloved… This close relationship between 
speaker and hearer means that the speaker’s admonitions, threats, criticisms, 
exhortations and attempts to shame or humble are the more effective. He knows 
his hearers; he knows precisely what will move and persuade them to a particular 
course of actions; he knows what is needed to instil a particular lesson or to 
communicate a particular idea.23  
 
In this way, Scripture “was given a voice in the spoken words of the preacher, which 
meant that it could enter into a dialogue with the hearer, be applied to their individual 
circumstances, and effectively impressed upon their mind.”24 In presenting 
Chrysostom’s preaching and his relationship with his audience in this way she casts 
them as a kind of Platonic/Sympotic dialogue: Chrysostom and his audience are in a 
loving relationship and share a thought world and it is these characteristics that 
enabled Chrysostom to communicate his message successfully to them. At the same 
time, as in Plato’s ideal for mass communication outlined by Peters, Chrysostom was 
able to adapt what he said to the listeners so that he could control the conversation.25  
This dialogic model for how Chrysostom’s preaching works as successful 
communication is stated most clearly in Harrison, but also underlies a number of other 
works.  Margaret Mitchell, in her The Heavenly Trumpet: John Chrysostom and the Art 
of Pauline Interpretation, momentarily seems to recognise that Chrysostom’s preaching 
might constitute a form of mass communication different from anything seen before in 
the ancient world when she writes of it as “live radio,” but throughout the rest of her 
work she seems to favour a more dialogic model of communication for Chrysostom.26 
Thus she describes Chrysostom’s homilies on Paul as “compositions which are at once 
 
20 Harrison, “Typology of Listening,” 62.  
21 Harrison, “Typology of Listening,” 65. 
22 Harrison, “Typology of Listening,” 66. 
23 Harrison, “Typology of Listening,” 67. 
24 Harrison, “Typology of Listening,” 68. See also, 72. 
25 Harrison, “Typology of Listening,” 67. 
26 Margaret M. Mitchell, The Heavenly Trumpet: John Chrysostom and the Art of Pauline Interpretation 
(Louisville–London: Westminster John Knox Press, 2002), 196. 
  
 
exegetical, liturgical and rhetorical, participating in recognized sets of expectations and 
functions which bound together orator and audience in the act of sermonic biblical 
interpretation.”27 The influence of the dialogic model can also be seen when Mitchell 
writes of the way Chrysostom tried to create the sense of a face-to-face dialogue and 
loving relationship between Paul and his audience via his verbal portraits of Paul. 28 
Mitchell argues that the “love hermeneutics” that Chrysostom used in his interpretation 
of Paul was “a hermeneutic of conformity” because the “conversation” between Paul and 
the audience that Chrysostom sought to stimulate created an unbreakable “spiritual and 
intellectual” bond between them.29 There was thus no room for distance between what 
Paul meant by his words and how the audience understood them. Similarly, Francis 
Young’s analysis of late-antique preaching talks of the way it taught ideals already 
shared by the Christian community as the factor that “ensured they were consistently 
heard in a meaningful way.”30 As a result, Young ultimately still sees the preacher as 
completely in charge of the message he preached and of the responses his audience had 
to it, and describes late-antique preaching as an example of Averil Cameron’s notion of 
the “totalizing discourse’”created by Christianity in late antiquity.31 Young thus 
recognises the undemocratic nature of dialogic communication, but still sees it as the 
only way that communication can really take place.32  
Even scholars who do allow for a greater distance between Chrysostom and his 
audience end up falling back on some of the assumptions outlined above. Rylaarsdam’s 
chapter “Chrysostom’s Homiletical Method” in his recent book John Chrysostom on 
Divine Pedagogy accepts the “weaknesses” of Chrysostom’s audiences and that 
Chrysostom needed to adapt his message to their level, just as God adapted his message 
to humans.33 Rylaarsdam describes various ways in which Chrysostom adapted what he 
said in order to bring the audience around to Christian ways of thinking and move them 
away from alternate images with which they were being bombarded in city life. While 
this does allow for some difference between Chrysostom and his audience and does 
provide some insightful analysis of what Chrysostom thought he was doing, the model 
of divine condescension on which it is based can be aligned with Peters’ understanding 
of Plato’s ideals for mass communication in which the speaker adapts what he says to 
the audience to prevent any unintended messages or misinterpretations, and so allows 
the speaker to continue to control the message. At the same time, Rylaarsdam still 
writes in a way that assumes Chrysostom’s eventual success at bringing around his 
audiences to his way of thinking and still works with a model of preaching as 
totalitarian and as creating a single unified Christian discourse. As he puts it, 
“Chrysostom creates a universe of symbols in listeners’ minds, so that people 
 
27 Mitchell, Heavenly Trumpet, 21–2. 
28 Mitchell, Heavenly Trumpet, 408. Mitchell uses Plato’s image of the chain of inspiration from Ion 533D 
to explain Chrysostom’s “love hermeneutics.” 
29 Mitchell, Heavenly Trumpet, 39–40.  
30 Frances M. Young, Biblical Exegesis and the Formation of Christian Culture (Peabody, Mass.: 
Hendrickson, 2002), 28. 
31 Young, Biblical Exegesis, 257. 
32 See also Hagit Amirav, Rhetoric and Tradition: John Chrysostom on Noah and the Flood, TEG (Leuven: 
Peeters, 2003), 20, 29–30, 33–4, 89 and 221, which relies on similar kinds of assumptions; and also the 
work of Raymond Laird, which does reference the work of cognitive science on metaphors, but which still 
focuses on Chrysostom’s intentions and his successful use of rhetoric to achieve his goals with his 
audiences (Mindset, Moral Choice and Sin in the Anthropology of John Chrysostom [Strathfield, NSW: St 
Paul’s Publications, 2012], 12–15 and 260). 
33 David Rylaarsdam, John Chrysostom on Divine Pedagogy: The Coherence of his Theology and Preaching 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), chapter 6, esp. 228. 
  
 
reconceive reality through the lens of Scripture and are persuaded towards a wise way 
of life.”34 For Rylaarsdam this means that Chrysostom’s homilies are a prime example of 
Averil Cameron’s “totalizing Christian discourse.”35  
Maxwell, in her work Christianization and Communication in Late Antiquity, in 
contrast, sees the dialogic nature of Chrysostom’s preaching as a sign of its democratic 
nature. Like Rylaarsdam she argues that Chrysostom adapted his methods of pedagogy 
and communication to suit the range of educational levels in his audience.36 She also 
explores the ways in which the views of Chrysostom’s audiences of what it meant to be 
a Christian diverged from their preacher’s, and argues that Chrysostom’s homilies can 
be seen as dialogues with his audience over what constituted orthodox behaviour.37 In 
her view, this dialogic nature of his preaching allowed for Chrysostom to have influence 
over his laity, but not to control them completely, so that ordinary Christians could have 
an “impact on the development of their religion.”38 This seems to get close to Peters’ call 
for a model of communication in which we respect the difference of others while still 
allowing for words to have some of their desired effect and Maxwell herself describes it 
as being characteristic of a “democratization of theology” that some of have attributed 
to late antiquity.39 The problem is that in the end Maxwell only allows for the 
conversation between preacher and audience and for this more democratic vision of 
preaching to happen “once a cultural chasm between the preachers and their audiences 
is no longer presupposed” and we accept that “the good or average Christians probably 
outweighed the bad ones.”40 For her this initial common ground provided the only basis 
on which Chrysostom and his audience could communicate. This means that even here 
there seems to be the need to disallow the free dissemination of Chrysostom’s speech to 
whoever came and to limit the possibility of communication between those who held 
different views. Maxwell thus still conforms to the dialogic model of communication. 
A rather different approach to these kinds of questions can be found in Simon 
Goldhill’s important edited volume, The End of Dialogue in Antiquity. Goldhill, like 
Peters, seeks to explore the privileging of dialogue in modern discourse, but focuses in 
particular on the question of whether Christians in late antiquity put an end to dialogue 
because there was something inherent in Christianity that made it tend towards more 
hierarchical and authoritarian modes of expression.41 Lim and Clark are two of the 
contributors to Goldhill’s volume who respond to this challenge by focusing on late-
antique preaching. They argue that Christian leaders did reject the dialogue form, but 
not because there was anything inherently antithetical to dialogue about Christianity. 
Rather, it was because dialogue’s elitist nature, and the way it presumed a certain 
shared level of education among participants, was not suited to the task that faced late-
antique preachers when they sought to teach the Christian message to large, mixed 
 
34 Rylaarsdam, Divine Pedagogy, 229–30. 
35 Rylaarsdam, Divine Pedagogy, 229, quoting Averil Cameron, Christianity and the Rhetoric of Empire: 
The Development of Early Christian Discourse (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), 21. See 
also Rylaarsdam, Divine Pedagogy, 242 and 248. 
36 Maxwell, Christianization and Communication, chapter 4. 
37 Maxwell, Christianization and Communication, chapters 5–6, esp. 143.  
38 Maxwell, Christianization and Communication, 169 and 170. 
39 Maxwell, Christianization and Communication, 171, referring to J-M, Carrié, “Antiquité tardive et 
‘démocratisation de la culture’: un paradigm à géométrie variable,” Antiquité Tardive 9 (2001): 46. 
40 Maxwell, Christianization and Communication, 172, for the first quote; 110, for the second quote. 
41 Simon Goldhill, “Introduction: Why Don’t Christians Do Dialogue,” in The End of Dialogue in Antiquity, 
ed. Simon Goldhill (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 1, 4–5, 7 and 8. 
  
 
urban audiences.42 In such contexts of mass communication, Lim and Clark suggest, 
preachers were very aware of the misunderstandings that could arise in audiences who 
did not share their levels of education and Christianisation.43 They could not risk the 
give and take of the dialogic form, which they thought left too much room for 
misunderstanding and instead had to adopt a more authoritarian mode of 
communication.44 Thus while sermons might adopt a conversational style, in fact “they 
offered a single voice” and various forms of “talking to, or talking at, or replying to 
questions, not talking with.”45 Lim and Clark thus allow for some critique of the dialogue 
form, with its exclusivity and its associations with elite culture and no longer try to 
shoehorn preaching into the model dialogue, but they leave intact stereotypes about 
mass communication as being more authoritative and less democratic than dialogue.46  
This analysis shows that in previous scholarship on late-antique preaching, and 
in Chrysostom’s preaching in particular, there has been a lot of confusion over how far 
dialogue and mass communication can be judged to be democratic or totalitarian modes 
of communication and a misunderstanding of what counts as good communication, with 
most scholars assuming that it means Chrysostom’s speech having the impact he 
intended and constituting dialogue between people who basically already agree with 
one another.  Peters’ approach provides some clarity in respect to these issues because 
it argues convincingly that mass communication is more democratic and a more 
accurate model of how communication works precisely because it acted as a form of 
free dissemination that allowed people to make their own interpretation of its 
messages.  
What Peter’s approach cannot do, however, is provide us with any more details 
about the way the processes of decoding by the audience happened and how they 
understood, and made their own interpretations of, what the preacher said. The answer 
of scholars such as Harrison and Mitchell to this problem is to follow ancient models of 
mind and ancient theories of cognition. They thus adopt a blank slate model of the mind 
and see the minds of those in the audiences of preaching as being like wax tablets on 
which the words of the speaker were indented, and which can easily be wiped clean 
before correct teachings are imposed on it.47 They are thus susceptible to the accusation 
that cognitive scientists often make against those working in the arts and social sciences 
of taking a “mind-blind” approach to cultural transmission, in which the mind is seen as 
a “blank slate” or “cultural sponge” that “learns what to think from culture.”48 Having a 
theoretical approach that helps us with this problem is particularly important in the 
case of late-antique preaching because we have so little evidence for the audience point 
of view. Cognitive science, which takes as its starting point that pre-existing structures 
 
42 Gillian Clark, “Can We Talk? Augustine and the Possibility of Dialogue,” in The End of Dialogue in 
Antiquity, ed. Simon Goldhill (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 118 (and also 123, 128 and 
132–4); and Richard Lim, “Christians, Dialogues, and Patterns of Sociability in Late Antiquity,” in ibid., 
151, 154, 166–8, and 171. 
43 Clark, “Can we Talk,” 132–4. 
44 Clarke, “Can we Talk,” 132–4; and Lim, “Christians, Dialogues,” 161. 
45 Clarke, “Can we Talk,” 118 and 127, for the two quotes. See also Lim, “Christians, Dialogues,” 167–8. 
46 Clarke, “Can we Talk,” 124–5; and Lim, “Christians, Dialogues,” 154, 166 and 171. 
47 Jocelyn Penny Small, Wax Tablets of the Mind: Cognitive Studies of Memory and Literacy in Classical 
Antiquity (London: Routledge, 1997) and Mitchell, Heavenly Trumpet, 55–64. The explicit influence of 
Small’s model of the mind can be seen in Harrison, “Typology of Listening,” 64. Wendy Mayer, “Preaching 
Hatred. John Chrysostom, Neuroscience and the Jews,” Chapter 10 in this volume, also challenges the 
“mind–blind” approaches to the study of Chrysostom’s preaching. 
48 D. Jason Slone, Theological Incorrectness: Why Religious People Believe What They Shouldn’t (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press: 2004), 121–2.   
  
 
and content in the human mind are crucial to models of communication and knowledge 
transmission, can, I argue, help us here because it outlines principles that are applicable 
to all “cognitively modern” human minds and so can tell us something at least about the 
minds of ancient people even if only in general terms. 49 I will first use the cognitive 
science of how people comprehend verbal discourse to reinforce Peters’ argument 
about the gap between decoding and encoding in all communication and to provide a 
way to understand some of the parameters that limit the ability of the speaker to 
control the reception of what they say.50 I will then turn to the cognitive science of 
religion (CSR) to add further nuance to our understanding of these parameters and to 
show that the types of religious ideas people developed when listening to preaching 
matter because, according to CSR, some ideas spread more easily than others among 
human populations.51 This in turn will help us suggest some possible answers to our 
larger question of why Christianity was ultimately successful and the role that late-
antique preaching, including that of Chrysostom, had in this success.  
 
2 Cognitive Science, The Comprehension of Verbal Discourse, and The 
Transmission of Religious Knowledge 
 
Cognition can be defined as “the set of processes by which we come to know the world,” 
and cognitive science is thus “the set of disciplines which investigate these processes 
and propose explanatory theories about them.”52 It is the exploration of the mental 
processes involved when we gain knowledge about any aspect of the world around us. 
This includes how humans comprehend verbal discourse of any kind, from the briefest 
of conversations to the most highly developed works of literature. The question is that 
of what happens in the minds of listeners and readers when they first read or hear 
verbal discourse such as preaching. The answer provided by cognitive scientists is, to 
 
49 Peters himself dismisses cognitive science as having the answers to the problem of communication 
because of what he calls its emphasis on “information exchange.” Instead, he prefers to think in terms of 
the pragmatic results of communication—what it can get done despite the tendency towards 
misinterpretation and misunderstanding (Peters, Speaking into Air, 24). For a classic example of how 
cognitive scientists interpret data normally taken to be culturally specific in terms of universally human 
mental processes, see Mark Turner’s analysis of Clifford Geertz’s account of the Balinese cock fight in 
Mark Turner, Cognitive Dimensions of Social Science (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). 
50 Because of my interest in how Chrysostom’s audiences understood his preaching, I focus on the sub-
branch of cognitive science that deals with the way human minds process verbal discourse. In addition, in 
order to provide a simple way into the field for non-experts, I rely here mostly on works that have 
summarised these findings for application to the study of literature and other types of verbal discourse 
discussed by the humanities. 
51 A number of scholars have begun to apply the findings of CSR to early and late-antique Christianity. See, 
for example, István Czachesz, “The Gospels and Cognitive Science,” in Learned Antiquity: Scholarship and 
Society in the Near East, the Greco-Roman World, and the Early Medieval West, ed. A.A. MacDonald, M.W. 
Twomey, and G.J. Reinink (Leuven: Peeters, 2003), 25–36; The Grotesque Body in Early Christian 
Discourse (Sheffield: Equinox, 2012); “The Transmission of Early Christian Thought: Towards a Cognitive 
Psychological Model,” Studies in Religion/Sciences Religieuses 36.1 (2007): 65–83; and Petri Luomanen, 
Ilkka Pyysiäinen and Risto Uro, eds, Explaining Christian Origins: Contributions from Cognitive and Social 
Sciences (Leiden: Brill, 2008) and all the contributions therein.  
52 E. Thomas Lawson, “Cognition,” in The Guide to the Study of Religion, ed. W. Braun and R.T. 
McCutcheon (New York: Cassell, 2000), 75. For an alternative but complementary summary of cognitive 
science, in particular cognitive poetics and Text World Theory, see Jan R. Stenger, “Text Worlds and 
Imagination in Chrysostom’s Pedagogy,” Chapter 13 in this volume. 
  
 
put it simply, that they assimilate it to their existing knowledge.53 This is the defining 
feature of the approach of cognitive science to knowledge acquisition and to human 
modes of communication by which this is achieved. As Gavins puts it, 
 
communication is both the means by which knowledge is transferred between 
human beings and the process by which those human beings interconnect the new 
knowledge structures they encounter through communication with existing 
beliefs, intermediate perceptions and previous experiences. [...] We do not simply 
gather knowledge through communication, we actively construct it. Through the 
process of inferencing, we make use of existing knowledge structures—linguistic, 
experiential, perceptual and cultural—in order to make sense of new sensory and 
linguistic input.54 
 
Without this process of relating what one hears to existing knowledge, understanding 
cannot be said to have taken place. This emphasis on the existing knowledge of 
participants in processes of communication means that the speaker or writer can never 
control completely how people receive his or her words because so much of the process 
of comprehension takes place in the mind of the person receiving that discourse.55 All 
the author, or the words she or he produces, can do is provide “linguistic and inferential 
information that narrows the search down to one or a very few specific domains of 
knowledge.”56 The rest of the process takes place in the mind of the receiver who firstly 
decides the direction in which to take the interpretation on the basis of contextual 
factors, such as their recent experiences, the immediate context in which the act of 
communication takes place and their own goals, and then secondly relates what they 
hear to their existing cultural and personal knowledge.57 Assigning meaning to a text, 
making a mental representation of it, can thus be described as an inferential process in 
which the reader or listener fills in gaps in the discourse with their own existing 
knowledge.58 This means that individual readers or listeners can assign meanings to the 
same piece of verbal discourse that are different not only from those intended by the 
speaker, but also from each other.59 It also means that understanding something does 
not result in people having what they know completely transformed by what they hear 
and does not involve replication of the thoughts of the speaker in the minds of the 
receivers.  
In fact, the emphasis on assimilating new knowledge to existing knowledge 
means that it can be hard to change how people think. As Schank and Abelson put it, 
“[u]nderstanding is knowledge-based… New information is understood in terms of old 
 
53 On the central role of the existing knowledge in the minds of readers/listeners, see also Stenger, “Text 
Worlds and Imagination.” 
54 Joanna Gavins, Text World Theory: An Introduction (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2007), 24 
and 18–20. 
55 Gavins, Text World, 59–60; and Peter Stockwell, Cognitive Poetics: An Introduction (London–New York: 
Routledge, 2002), 91. 
56 Stockwell, Cognitive Poetics, 122. See also, Gavins, Text World, 29. 
57 On existing knowledge, Gavins, Text World, 6. See also Stockwell Cognitive Poetics, 7–8, 75; Turner, 
Cognitive Dimensions, 12. On the importance of other contextual factors, Robert P. Shank and Roger C. 
Abelson, Scripts, Plans, Goals and Understanding (Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, 1977), 9; Stockwell, 
Cognitive Poetics, 31 and 33; Gavins, Text World, 6. 
58 Gavins, Text World, 24 and 38. See also Patrick Colm Hogan, Cognitive Science, Literature and the Arts: 
A Guide for Humanists (New York–London: Routledge), 160. 
59 Stockwell, Cognitive Poetics, 123 and also 8. 
  
 
information. Man is a processor that only understands what has previously been 
understood.”60 The problem with this view is that it can make it hard to see how people 
could ever learn anything new, and it is now a little out-dated. More recently, attempts 
have been made to explain how human minds can combine what is heard in verbal 
discourse with existing knowledge and so learn new things.61 The emphasis on the role 
of the creation of new meaning in the understanding process is particularly prominent 
in the work of Mark Turner on conceptual blending.62 For Turner conceptual blending is 
“the central engine of human meaning,” the way in which humans create new meaning 
out of existing meanings, by combining information in new ways.63 The resulting 
meaning is, as Turner put it, “not identical to either of its influences…not merely a 
correspondence between them, and not even an additive combination of some of their 
features,” but rather a new “child” meaning.64 When we apply this to how listeners 
process verbal discourse, we can see verbal discourse as contributing to one of the input 
spaces and the existing knowledge of the audiences as contributing to the other. The 
mental representation those listening make of the verbal discourse is thus a blend of 
information provided by the discourse and information in the mind of the listener. As 
such it is something that can neither be found in the text, nor something that already 
exists in the mind of the listener, but instead is something new.   
However, even with this recognition of how new knowledge can be created in 
human minds, there is still a very strong sense of the power of existing knowledge and 
of the tendency to assimilate what we hear to it, unless there is a very strong impetus 
not to. As Turner argues of conceptual blending, there is still a tendency for us to 
“recruit selectively from our most favoured patterns of knowing and thinking. 
Consequently, blending is very powerful, but also heavily subject to bias.”65 Gavins 
refers to this as “the principle of minimum departure;” people will assume that they can 
fill out the gaps left in the texts with familiar information from their minds “until they 
are presented with information to the contrary.”66 One of the few pieces of work 
applying cognitive theory to the reception of religious teachings, such as those normally 
 
60 Schank and Abelson, 67. See also the work of Frederic Bartlett, Remembering: A Study in Experimental 
and Social-Psychology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1932); and J.W. Alba and L. Hasher, “Is 
Memory Schematic?,” Psychology Bulletin 93 (1983): 203–31. 
61 Some of the earliest work in this direction was carried out in the 1970s: David E. Rumelhart and Donald 
A. Norman, “Accretion, Tuning, and Restructuring: Three Modes of Learning,” in Semantic Factors in 
Cognition, ed. J.W. Cotton and R.A. Klatzky (Hillside, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, 1978), 37–53, and “Analogical 
Processes in Learning,” in Cognitive Skills and their Transmission, ed. J.R. Anderson (Hillside, NJ: 
Lawrence Erlbaum, 1981), 335–59. However, Mark Turner (Cognitive Dimensions, 144) has argued that 
these works don’t go far enough in understanding how new meaning is produced. Mayer, “Preaching 
Hatred,” in this volume discusses work from the related field of neuroscience, which has recently revealed 
the capacity the human brain has to learn new concepts.  
62 Turner, Cognitive Dimensions, 138–9. For Mark Turner this interest in the creation of new meaning, 
rather than in simply describing existing knowledge, is what distinguishes cognitive science from the 
social sciences—and, we could argue, the humanities. Turner, Cognitive Dimensions, 11. For a critique of 
Mark Turner’s work, see Vladimir Glebkin, “Is Conceptual Blending the Key to the Mystery of Human 
Evolution and Cognition?,” Cognitive Linguistics 26.1 (2015): 95–111. 
63 Turner, Cognitive Dimensions, 21 and 15 and 54 (universally human) and 44 and 21, 17 and 139 (on 
engine of meaning). A full account of conceptual blending can be found at Turner, Cognitive Dimension 
(see especially 17–19) and in Mark Turner, The Literary Mind: The Origins of Thought and Language 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 12–25 and 57–84. 
 64 Turner, Cognitive Dimension, 17. 
65 Turner, Cognitive Dimensions, 75. 
66 Gavins, Text World, 12. 
  
 
found in preaching, supports this view.67 K.I. Pargament and D.V. DeRosa found that 
their experiments on how people recalled short passages of religious teaching offered 
“modest support for the notion that people tend to remember more accurately religious 
messages that are consistent with their [existing] religious beliefs” and that “people 
distort the content of the message to fit more closely with their [existing] religious 
beliefs.”68  
The existing cultural and personal knowledge of the audience, their normal and 
habitual ways of thinking, thus provide one kind of “cognitive constraint” on the ability 
of verbal discourse to change how people think, or for the author of that discourse to 
impose their thoughts on the audience. Turning to the cognitive science of religion 
(CSR) can help us to understand that when it comes to verbal discourse on religious 
matters there are also other very particular cognitive constraints that we need to take 
into account. The cognitive science of religion seeks to explore why some religious 
concepts spread more successfully than others and are more widespread in human 
populations. CSR scholars focus on the nature of the human minds transmitting 
religious concepts and ask whether some types of concepts have content that makes 
them fit particularly well with these human minds—what they call “content biases.” 
They eschew the memes model of cultural and religious transmission in which religious 
ideas self-replicate as exact copies in the minds with which they come into contact.69 
They also oppose “mind-blind” approaches to learning and the transmission of culture, 
which tend to assume that people simply absorb the culture around them and so all end 
up thinking the same way.70 Instead they argue that people “have active minds that are 
continuously engaged in the construction of novel thoughts and in the transformation of 
culturally transmitted ideas.”71 As Slone puts it, 
 
The cultural model of religion, not to mention conventional wisdom, implies that 
religious people deduce their thoughts from the premises of given theological, 
cultural, or scientific premises, but in fact people spend most of their time thinking 
abductively and so use online cognitive strategies that employ tacit, noncultural 
knowledge about the world and its workings. Therefore, the key to understanding 
religion—especially ‘lived’ religion—is to identify the aspects of cognition that 
constrain religious behavior… .72 
 
To understand these non-cultural, cognitive constraints we need to grasp the 
basic distinction CSR makes between religious ideas that are, on the one hand, natural, 
intuitive, unreflective and easy for human minds to remember, use and transmit to 
 
67 K.I. Pargament and D.V. DeRosa, “What Was That Sermon About? Predicting Memory for Religious 
Messages From Cognitive Psychology Theory,” Journal of the Scientific Study of Religion 24.2 (1985): 
119–236. 
68 Pargament and DeRosa, “What Was That Sermon About?,” 190. 
69 Pascal Boyer, Religion Explained: The Human Instincts that Fashion Gods, Spirits and Ancestors 
(London: Vintage Books, 2002), 38–51. 
70 D. Jason Slone, Theological Incorrectness: Why Religious People Believe What They Shouldn’t (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press: 2004), 121–2. 
71 Slone, Theological Incorrectness, 121–2: Slone, following Sperber, pointed out that when ideas spread 
in a given human population, they are constantly undergoing transformation: “when people make their 
representations public, and then when recipients of the representation hear and process them.” (Slone, 
Theological Incorrectness, 64–6). See also Ilkka Pyysiӓinen, How Religion Works: Towards a Cognitive 
Science of Religion (Leiden: Brill, 2003), 11; Barrett, Why Would Anyone, 10–11; and Boyer, Religion 
Explained, 47–51. 
72 Slone, Theological Incorrectness, 121–2; see also Pyysiӓinen, How Religion Works, 11. 
  
 
others and those, on the other hand, that are unnatural, highly counter-intuitive, 
reflective and hard for human minds to remember, use and transmit.73 Intuitive, natural 
and unreflective concepts are either thought to fit in most ways with universal 
ontological categories thought to be shared human minds (such as inanimate object, 
person, animal), but to violate one of the characteristics of that category in a way that 
makes them much more memorable than entirely intuitive concepts because they stand 
out—Boyer's minimally counterintuitive (MCI) concepts74—or they are thought to be 
anthropomorphising in nature in that they assume that divine entities are intentional 
agents who act and think like humans.75 Because they are based in our ordinary 
cognitive processes and categories, such ideas are thought to be very easy to process 
and make inferences from and thus for people to remember and pass on to others.76 
When using them, human minds can default to assuming that in most ways they act like 
any other member of that ontological category. However, such concepts are usually seen 
by cognitive scientists to be confined to popular religious concepts such as ghosts, 
which deviate from the category “person” because they do not have a solid body but in 
most other ways act and think like humans, and anthropomorphic divinities, who are in 
some sense meant to be all-seeing and all-powerful but otherwise act, think and even 
look like human beings.77 The theological concepts of mainstream religions, such as 
Christian doctrinal formulations about the relationship between God, the Word, Jesus 
Christ and the Holy Spirit and the understanding of God as a completely transcendent, 
nonmaterial, all-knowing, infinite and limitless being, are, in contrast, thought to be 
highly counter-intuitive and complex, and thus to be very hard for the human mind to 
memorise and transmit.78 Such theological conceptions of divinity are, in the cognitive 
science of religion, seen to open up an ontological gap between God and humans that is 
hard to bridge; how can we understand such divinities if we have no way to relate them 
to ourselves and our own experience or to fit them into one of our existing ontological 
categories?79 
Cognitive scientists thus argue that there are clear cognitive constraints that 
make it hard for human populations to grasp more complex theological ideas. 
 
73 Re more intuitive versus less intuitive, see Boyer Religion Explained; reflective versus unreflective, see 
Dan Sperber, “Intuitive and Reflective Beliefs,” Mind and Language 12 (1997): 67–83; natural versus 
unnatural, see Robert N. McCauley, Why Religion is Natural and Science is Not (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2011). 
74 Boyer, Religion Explained, 58–105. On cognitively optimal religious concepts generally, see also Harvey 
Whitehouse, Modes of Religiosity: A Cognitive Theory of Religious Transmission (Walnut Creek, CA: Alta 
Mira Press, 2004), 29–48. 
75 Stewart Guthrie, Faces in the Clouds: A New Theory of Religion (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1993); and Justin L. Barrett and Frank C. Keil, “Conceptualizing a Non-natural Entity: Anthropomorphism 
in God Concepts,” Cognitive Psychology 31 (1996): 219–47. For a slightly different approach to the issues, 
see Pascal Boyer “What Makes Anthropomorphism Natural: Intuitive Ontology and Cultural 
Representations,” The Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute 2.1 (1996): 83–97. 
76 Slone, Theological Incorrectness, 5 and 47. 
77 On ghosts, see Boyer, Religion Explained, 84–86. 
78 Barret and Kiel, “Conceptualizing,” 219–21; and Pyysiӓinen, How Religion Works, 11. On cognitively 
costly concepts generally, see Whitehouse, Modes of Religiosity, 49–59. Some have begun to challenge the 
stark contrast between natural, more intuitive concepts of the divine and highly counterintuitive 
theological ones. See Helen de Cruz, “Cognitive Science of Religion and the Study of Theological Concepts,” 
Topoi 23.2 (2014): 487–97; Helen de Cruz and Johan de Smedt, A Natural History of Natural Theology: 
The Cognitive Science of Theology and Philosophy of Religion (Cambridge, Mass.: Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology Press, 2015); and Ilkka Pyysiӓinen, Supernatural Agents: Why We Believe in Souls, Gods 
and Buddhas (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 95–136. 
79 Barrett and Kiel, “Conceptualizing,” 220. 
  
 
Whitehouse has suggested in his discussion of what he calls the doctrinal mode of 
religiosity that methods of cultural transmission can overcome this problem by 
supporting the memorisation and transmission of these kinds of ideas via explicit 
systems of education, preaching, constant repetition and rote learning.80 The problem is 
that in Whitehouse’s model constant exposure to explicit education systems that repeat 
the message is needed for such ideas to be transmitted faithfully.81 More recent work 
suggests that even when people do come to learn highly complex theological ideas from 
such repeated theological teachings and are able to reproduce them in certain 
circumstances, they do not use them when engaged in “online reasoning” about the 
divine. Barrett and Kiel conducted experiments involving people who attributed to God 
“such nonhuman properties as being able to pay attention to multiple activities at the 
same time, not having a single location but being either everywhere or nowhere, not 
needing to hear or see to know about things, being able to read minds, and so forth.”82 
Taking as their starting point the way that human minds fill out verbal discourse they 
encounter with their existing knowledge, they presented this group with an outline 
narrative that left a number of details unspecified and then asked them to recall it to see 
whether they used prescribed, complex, theological ideas to fill it out, or other ideas. 
They found that the test subjects “systematically misremembered God as having human 
properties in contradiction to these theological ones” including “being able to pay 
attention to only one thing at a time, moving from one location to another, having only 
one particular location in space and time, and needing to hear and see things to know 
about them.”83 It seems that this more intuitive way of thinking about God over-rode 
consciously held theologically correct knowledge in certain contexts. What Barrett and 
Kiel concluded, as summarised by Barrett, is that 
 
[p]eople seem to have difficulty maintaining the integrity of their reflective 
theological concepts in rapid, real-time problem-solving because of the processing 
demands. Theological properties, such as being able to be in multiple places at 
once, not needing to perceive, being able to attend to an infinite number of 
problems at once, and not being bound by time, importantly deviate from the non-
reflective beliefs that mental tools freely generate… Thus, when presented with 
accounts of God…that must be rapidly comprehended and remembered, most of 
the features that do not enjoy the strong support of mental tools get replaced by 
simpler, non-reflective versions that can produce rapid inferences, predictions and 
explanations.84  
 
 
80 He opposes this doctrinal mode of religion to what he calls an imagistic mode in which people learn 
complex religious ideas by undergoing dramatic rituals that embed them in episodic memory. He sees the 
religious ideas transmitted by the doctrinal and the imagistic mode to be in opposition to the more 
natural and intuitive religious ideas discussed in Boyer’s work (Whitehouse, Modes of Religiosity). 
81 On the importance of rote learning in early medieval Christianity, see the second edition of Mary 
Carruthers, The Book of Memory: A Study of Memory in Medieval Culture (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008), xii–xiii and chapter 3, but she focuses on monastic culture and on those who 
devote their lives to Christianity rather than on lay Christians. 
82 Justin L. Barrett, Why Would Anyone Believe in God? (Lanham, MD–Plymouth: Alta Mira Press, 2004), 
10–11, summarising research published in Barrett and Kiel, “Conceptualizing.” 
83 Barrett, Why Would Anyone, 10–11. See also, Ilkka Pyysiӓinen, “Intuitive and Explicit in Religious 
Thought,” JCognCult 4.1 (2004): 125.  
84 Barrett, Why Would Anyone, 11. For a critique of Barrett and Kiel’s work, see James A. van Slyke, The 
Cognitive Science of Religion (Farnham–Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2011), 61–90. 
  
 
It seems that while individuals can repeat theologically correct ideas when asked 
about them directly, when using and transmitting them “in every day contexts,” they 
tend to simplify them and to “‘shut down’ or ‘bracket’ the counterintuitive features of 
concepts so that inferences are made on the basis of intuitive aspects only.”85 This 
means that the theological ideas learnt “in one’s culture…play only a partial role in what 
people think and do” and even when people know correct theological ideas, this does 
not control how they think and act.86 As Pyysiӓinen puts it, 
 
Written theologies are not exhaustive catalogues of the beliefs of a given 
population. They rather are artefacts that serve as cues directing peoples’ 
inferences… The actually represented ideas do not mechanically follow from the 
perceived stimuli; they are brought about by an active inferential or associative 
process in the mind of the person in question (as argued in Sperber and Wilson 
1986). There are no intrinsic meanings in written texts (or spoken words) that 
could be passively downloaded; we rather attribute meanings to texts (or to 
speech) in the light of what we already know and believe.87  
 
In CSR, as compared to cognitive science more generally, the “what people already know 
and believe” is often confined to non-cultural, natural and intuitive religious concepts. 
The actual religious representations made in the minds of individuals are thus thought 
to differ from correct theological ideas in entirely predictable, narrowly confined 
ways.88 As Slone seems to recognise, this can lead to the idea that individual human 
behaviour is “genetically predetermined.”89 To counter this reductionism, I argue that 
we need to allow for a broader range of influences on the way that individuals 
transform and simplify the theological ideas to which they are exposed.90 We need to 
accept that representations of the divine that individuals make will be affected not just 
by the universal human tendency to favour anthropomorphic deities, but also by the full 
range of the existing knowledge in their minds including cultural and personal 
knowledge. This means that the anthropomorphising representations people make of 
God “may vary enormously in different cultures” and, I would argue, within cultures.91 
This provides us with a response to those who take a “mind-blind” approach.92 It also 
helps us answer the objections of those who say we can know nothing about the 
responses of Chrysostom’s audiences due to lack of evidence. Even if we cannot know 
much in exact detail about how people understood what Chrysostom said, the tendency 
to favour anthropomorphising conceptions and the way people assimilate what they 
hear to their existing knowledge at least provide controlling parameters that show the 
kinds of restrictions there might be on how at least some in his audiences received his 
words. 
 
3 Cognitive Science and Chrysostom’s Preaching as Mass Communication   
 
85 Pyysiӓinen, “Intuitive and Explicit,” 142. 
86 Slone, Theological Incorrectness, 4–5. See also 64–6. 
87 Pyysiӓinen, “Intuitive and Explicit,” 125, referring to Dan Sperber and Deirdre Wilson, Relevance: 
Communication and Cognition (Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1986). 
88 Slone, Theological Incorrectness, 22 and Whitehouse, Modes of Religiosity, 20. 
89 Slone, Theological Incorrectness, 122. 
90 For a much broader critique of the reductionism of the cognitive science of religion, see van Slyke, 
Cognitive Science. 
91 Pyysiӓinen, How Religion Works, 11. 
92 See n.47. 
  
 
 
In the first section, we suggested that mass communication was a better model for the 
way communication works generally, and that it can be used to critique those who try to 
shoehorn Chrysostom’s preaching into the dialogic model of communication due to the 
misguided assumption that this is the only way communication can really happen. We 
can now also argue that there is positive evidence for seeing Chrysostom’s preaching as 
a form of mass communication, rather than as a form of dialogue. Recent work on 
Chrysostom’s preaching has revealed the diverse nature of its audiences, both in terms 
of socio-cultural background, educational levels, gender and degrees of Christianisation. 
It follows that if his preaching can be deemed to have been successfully at all, it must 
have worked more like Peters’ understanding of mass communication.93 The relatively 
large size of the audiences, which could count in their hundreds, also suggests that 
Chrysostom’s preaching be seen as a form of mass communication because, as 
Simonson points out, situations in which an individual addresses large-scale, live 
audiences can be seen as akin to radio or TV transmission.94 This supports the idea that 
Mitchell suggests, but does not explore further, that Chrysostom’s preaching can be seen 
as live radio.95 
It might well have been Chrysostom’s ideal that the communication he had with 
his audiences was a kind of dialogue with like-minded individuals with high levels of 
Christianisation who were well-prepared to receive his teachings. As he suggests in his 
second homily from his longer series on Genesis, Lenten fasting could put his audiences 
in a state of mind that would make them particularly receptive to his teachings, 
 
So now is the right time, if ever there was one, for teachings of the kind I have in 
mind, when the maid no longer resists her mistress, but is docile, responsive and 
obedient, restraining the impulses of nature and keeping within proper limits.96 
 
He uses the metaphor of sowing in well-prepared soil to describe his preaching in such 
situations, 
 
So come now, let us imitate the farmers: when they see the land scarified and 
cleared of the obstruction of weeds, they sow the seed liberally. It should be the 
same with ourselves.97 
 
 
93 Re diversity of socio-economic backgrounds and educational levels of audience: Mayer, “Who Came to 
Hear”; and Frans van der Paverd, St. John Chrysostom, the Homilies on the Statues, OCA 239 (Rome: Pont. 
Institutum Studiorum Orientalium, 1991), 266–88; gender: Mayer, “Who Came to Hear”; lack of separate 
Christian educational system: E.G. Clark, “The Ant of God: Augustine, Scripture and the Curriculum,” in 
Shifting Cultural Frontiers in Late Antiquity, ed. David Brakke, Deborah M. Deliyannis, and Edward Watts 
(Farnham–Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2012), 151–63; different levels of Christianisation: Isabella Sandwell, 
Religious Identity in Late Antiquity: Greeks, Jews and Christians in Antioch (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007). 
94 Simonson, Reconfiguring, 23 (Simonson also suggests that “religious traditions” generally “house some 
of the oldest, deepest, and most significant ideas about and forms of mass communication” 
(Reconfiguring, 6). For the size of Chrysostom’s audiences, see Ramsay MacMullen, The Second Church: 
Popular Christianity AD 200–400 (Atlanta Ga.: Society of Biblical Literature, 2009), 12–14. Mayer, 
“Preaching Hatred” in this volume discusses the issue of the size of audiences in greater depth. 
95 Mitchell, Heavenly Trumpet, 196. 
96 In Gen. hom. 2.3 (PG 53.27.12–15). All translations of the homilies on Genesis, unless otherwise 
indicated, are those of Robert C. Hill (FC 74). 
97 In Gen. hom. 2.2 (PG 53.26.43–47). 
  
 
However, Lent was an exceptional season when larger than normal numbers of people 
came to church and sought to display their Christianity, so we can imagine that it was a 
time when audiences were particularly diverse.98 Chrysostom seems to recognise this at 
the start of Homily 6 on Genesis where he berates his audience just a short while later 
for having left behind their Lenten fasting and sobriety to attend the horse races. 
Despite the fact that he feels very strongly that the races will have put the audience in 
the wrong frame of mind to hear his words, he says he has a duty to preach to them 
anyway whatever the outcome: “whether you heed my words or reject them, the reward 
coming to me will be unimpaired.”99 He makes a similar point about Jesus’ preaching in 
his interpretation of the parable of the sower in his homilies on Matthew.100 It is clear 
that he understands that he is not always engaged in intimate dialogue with like-minded 
people who are ready to hear his words as he intends and that he cannot always know 
how his words will be received.   
Once we have accepted that preaching was a form of mass communication which 
involved free dissemination of teachings to those who heard them in different ways, we 
can move on to my second argument that, despite the lack of evidence, we can say 
something about the ways in which ancient audiences received what their preacher said 
by starting with Chrysostom’s words and using what we have learnt from cognitive 
science to sketch out the parameters of audience responses. 
One of the problems late-antique preachers like Chrysostom faced was that of 
how to teach difficult theological concepts to ordinary Christians. It was a time of great 
doctrinal debates about the nature of God and Christ and how the two related to one 
another and preachers knew they had a challenge on their hands striking the right 
balance between making these ideas comprehensible and remaining doctrinally correct. 
Studying how preachers taught these ideas and how audiences might have received 
them can provide a useful case study for exploring the applicability of the theories of 
communication and cognition discussed in the previous sections.  
Chrysostom’s first two homilies on Matthew contain an extended description of 
the heavenly city, which acts as an introduction to his preaching on the Gospel and to 
set the tone for that preaching. It is intended to tackle the problem that the Gospel of 
Matthew does not say as much as Chrysostom would like about Christ’s divine nature, at 
least in comparison to the Gospel of John. It uses a description of the heavenly kingdom 
to emphasise that this kingdom is the true subject of the Gospel, to remind his audiences 
that Christ and God are one and the same, and to emphasise that Christ is God incarnate. 
The incarnation—and, one could argue, in particular the Nicene version of this to which 
Chrysostom more or less subscribed—is a classic example of a highly counter-intuitive 
concept that would be hard for human minds to comprehend, remember and 
transmit.101 According to Whitehouse, such ideas can normally only be transmitted via 
rote learning of doctrinal formulations and “endless repetitions,” as suggested by his 
doctrinal mode.102 However, this is not the method that Chrysostom uses here where he 
 
98 Mayer, “Extraordinary Preacher,” 131. 
99 In Gen. hom. 6.2 (PG 53.54.55–57). 
100 In Matt. hom. 44.4 (PG 57.467.52–55). 
101 For a detailed study of Chrysostom’s understanding of the incarnation, see Melvin Edward Lawrenz, 
“The Christology of John Chrysostom” (PhD diss., Marquette University, 1987), 132–203. For a more 
recent analysis of Chrysostom’s christology, see Rylaarsdam, Divine Pedagogy, esp. 138. 
102 Whitehouse, Modes of Religiosity, 5 (and see the whole of the introduction). In an article on 
Chrysostom’s homilies on Genesis I have argued that Chrysostom did use a method that required his 
audiences to learn how to repeat the early lines of Genesis by rote without processing them further, and 
that in so doing he wanted to promote a sense of wonder at an incomprehensible God, who was able to 
  
 
instead chooses a vivid, narrative depiction of Christ/God as king to explain the fact that 
the incarnate was simultaneously a transcendental divine being and fully human. 
Chrysostom starts by providing a detailed description of the heavenly kingdom and its 
King. He first uses this image of the king to capture the idea of God/Christ’s divine 
nature, presenting him as living in a bejewelled palace in heaven surrounded by his 
heavenly courtiers. Chrysostom tells us that the heavenly Kingdom is made “of gold, and 
things more precious than any gold” with “gates consisting of sapphires and pearls.”103 
He goes on to describe “where the King sits, and who of His host stand by Him; where 
are the angels, where the archangels...[a]nd how many are the orders of these tribes, 
how many those of the senate, how many the distinctions of dignity.”104 In the next 
homily these images are returned to and developed into a representation of God/Christ 
as a triumphant military commander who was victorious over the devil like a 
triumphant general. 
 
In this place stands the trophy of the cross, brilliant and conspicuous, the spoils of 
Christ, the first-fruits of our nature, the booty of our King. For we shall know all of 
these things clearly from the Gospel. If you follow in appropriate silence, we shall 
be able to lead you about everywhere, and to show from this battle where death 
has been laid low crucified, and where sin is hanged up, and where are the many 
and wondrous offerings from this war. You shall see both the tyrant bound here, 
and the multitude of the captives following, and the citadel from which that unholy 
demon overran all things in earlier times.105 
 
The tyrant is, of course, the devil and the trophy of the cross refers to the role of Christ’s 
death and resurrection in overcoming the power that the devil had had over humanity 
since the fall of Adam. This shift then allows him to take the next step in which the 
image of God/Christ as a King is used to capture the role of the incarnate Christ in going 
down to earth to bring about the salvation of mankind. 
 
For consider how great it is to hear how, on the one hand, God having arisen ‘out of 
the royal thrones, leaped down’ from heaven to earth, and to hell itself, and stood 
in the battle array; and how, on the other hand, the devil set himself in array 
against Him; or rather not against God unveiled, but God hidden in man’s nature. 
And the marvel is that you will see death destroyed by death, and curse 
extinguished by curse, and through those things that made the devil powerful, 
through those will his tyranny be destroyed.106 
 
 
act in ways impossible for human beings (Isabella Sandwell, “How to Teach Genesis 1.1–19: John 
Chrysostom and Basil of Caesarea on the Creation of the World,” JECS 19.4 (2011): 539–64). I had not 
read Whitehouse at that point, but Chrysostom’s approach in those homilies fits well with his “doctrinal 
mode” of religious transmission. 
103 In Matt. hom. 1.17 (PG 57.23.14–17).  
104 In Matt. hom. 1.17 (PG 57.24.6–10). See also, “you shall see...the King Himself sitting on the throne of 
that unspeakable glory, and angels, and archangels standing by Him, and the tribes of the saints, with 
those interminable myriads.” In Matt. hom. 2.1 (PG 57.23.50–54).  
105 In Matt. hom. 2.1 (PG 57.24.34–47). For the Matthew homilies, I have based my translations on those 
found in NPNF 1, 10, but have made adjustments to these where I thought the style could be improved or 
the sense conveyed more accurately. 
106 In Matt. hom. 2.1 (PG 57.24.54–25.8), quoting Wisdom 18:15. 
  
 
A little later, Chrysostom then goes on to illustrate the way God came down to earth by 
comparing it to the way a King, in particular a Roman emperor, would live as a soldier 
among his troops when going into battle. 
 
[See] how it has immediately shown you the King in your own form, as though in 
an army camp? For the king does not always appear bearing the dignity proper to 
him, but laying aside his purple robe and his diadem, he often takes on the 
appearance of a foot soldier.107 
 
The image of God as a king can be found throughout the writings of the early 
fathers and onwards.108 That God is a king with a Kingdom is also a familiar idea from 
biblical texts—references to the heavenly kingdom are found repeatedly in Matthew 
and images of the royal court, of God sitting on his throne, and of the heavenly city were 
found numerous times throughout the Old Testament, especially Isaiah, Ezekiel and 
Psalms, and in the book of Revelation.109 Similarly, the image of Christ achieving a 
victory over the devil is also an entirely traditional and long accepted one in early 
Christianity as was first revealed by Gustaf Aulén, who sees it as playing a crucial role in 
the development of Nicene christology in opposition to Arianism and builds his 
“dramatic” model of atonement from it.110  
However, in the passage from the Matthew homilies Chrysostom takes these 
conventional images and develops them in new ways. He dramatised the Christus Victor 
image to an extreme degree so that we now have God/Christ getting up from his throne 
and “leaping down to earth” (the verb used is allomai) to fight an actual battle against 
the devil. In this way, Chrysostom was deliberately drawing on knowledge members of 
his audience would have had of kings who were normally distant from their subjects, 
but who in certain circumstances could lower themselves to live among ordinary 
people, to inform their understanding of the incarnation. He also takes what was a 
traditional Christian and biblical image of God as a king and gives it a new, untraditional 
twist as he tries to make the difficult idea of the incarnation more familiar to his 
audiences. Just like an earthly king (specifically a Roman emperor), God/Christ when 
fighting the battle with the devil will lay aside his normal clothes and appear as an 
ordinary soldier and live in the army camp with his men.111 By developing the metaphor 
of Christ the King who sits in a bejewelled palace in his heavenly kingdom so that it also 
included the way the king could dress like an ordinary soldier and live among the troops 
at times of battle Chrysostom was able to create one simple image that conveyed what 
was to go on to become orthodox christology: the image of the king stood for not only 
Christ’s divine nature but also his human nature and the incarnation.  
The trouble is that this image brings with it some potential dangers because the 
image of the divine that it presented, with Christ/God described as sitting on a throne 
and then leaping down from heaven to earth as if he had a body and legs, might be seen 
 
107 In Matt. hom. 2.3 (PG 57.26.28–33). 
108 The references are too many to mention, but the writings of Irenaeus provide a good starting point in 
the search for examples of the image. On the metaphor of the king to describe God, see Sallie McFague, 
Metaphorical Theology: Models of God in Religious Language (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1982). 
109 On Matthew, see Pennington, Heaven and Earth in the Gospel of Matthew, 2–3, 69 and esp. 281. On 
other images of heaven, see Russell, A History of Heaven, 13–14. 
110 Gustaf Aulén, Christus Victor: An Historical Study of the Three Main Types of the Idea of Atonement, 
trans. A.G. Herbert (London: SPCK, 1970), 22, 37, 53, 58–61 and 76. 
111 The metaphor of clothing is one that Chrysostom often used for the incarnation. See Rylaarsdam, 
Divine Pedagogy, 137. 
  
 
as more anthropomorphic than would normally have been acceptable. Similarly, the 
idea that the incarnate Christ was like a king living in a camp with his soldiers could 
have prompted the audience to elaborate on the normal metaphor of Christ/God as King 
and to imagine ways, other than that he is the ruler of heaven, in which he might be like 
an earthly king. On other occasions, Chrysostom warned his audiences against such 
anthropomorphising conceptions of God. Thus in the homilies on Genesis he tells them 
to take such anthropomorphic statements at the “level of expression” only. As he says, 
 
‘They heard the sound of the Lord God,’ the text says, ‘as he strolled in the garden 
in the evening…’ What are you saying—God strolls? Are we assigning feet to him? 
Have we no exalted conception of Him? No, God doesn’t stroll—perish the 
thought: how could he, present as he is everywhere and filling everything with his 
presence?112 
 
In this passage Chrysostom reasserts an unnatural, highly counter-intuitive notion of 
God—omnipresent—in the face of possible misleading language in the Old Testament, 
which spoke of God moving in physical space and using limbs. What, then, is going on 
when Chrysostom himself uses such an anthropomorphising image of God in the 
Matthew homilies? 
Scholars of Chrysostom and of late-antique Christianity generally have tended to 
see such images as part of a “material turn” in the fourth century in which the potential 
of “corporeal things” to signify religious truth was seen more positively than had been 
the case earlier.113 These images could, it has been argued, now be used as vehicles of 
transcendence and a way to point to the spiritual realities not normally seen by the 
human eye.114 As such, Rylaarsdam argues, they were for Chrysostom akin to “God’s 
habit of appropriating human form” and of looking, speaking and acting “like a human in 
order to reveal sublime truths” to them and thus constitute an example of Chrysostom’s 
“divine pedagogy,” the way he adapts what he says to the level of his audience.115 This 
is, of course, perfectly valid as an account of what Chrysostom was trying to do, of his 
explicit intentions. The problem comes when scholars move from this position to 
making assumptions about the success of such images when received by audience 
members. Rylaarsdam talks about Chrysostom using such images “to block and crowd” 
out those that enter their minds from civic life and to lead people away from 
“disproportionate attachment” to creatures and thus speaks of them as a “totalizing 
Christian discourse” that “created a universe for his listeners.”116 Thus although 
Rylaarsdam does recognise the presence of alternate images in the minds of 
Chrysostom’s listeners, he sees these as easily swept away by the power of 
Chrysostom’s rhetoric. To me this leap from Chrysostom’s intentions to the impact and 
success he has with his audiences is problematic. It constitutes an example of the “mind-
blindness” of those working from socio-cultural approaches, of the way they see the 
 
112 In Gen. hom. 17.3-4 (PG 53.135.15–20). 
113 Rylaarsdam, Divine Pedagogy, 240 referring to the work of Patricia Cox Miller in her Corporeal 
Imagination: Signifying the Holy in Late Antique Christianity (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 
Press, 2009). For similar approaches to the use of vivid verbal images by late-antique Christian leaders, 
see also Liz James and Ruth Webb, “To Understand Ultimate Things and Enter Secret Places: Ekphrasis 
and Art in Byzantium,” Art History 14 (1991): 1–14. 
114 Rylaarsdam, Divine Pedagogy, 240 and 242. 
115 Rylaarsdam, Divine Pedagogy, 248 and 240 and 243. 
116 Rylaarsdam, Divine Pedagogy, 239 and 242. 
  
 
human mind as a blank slate just waiting to be filled by teachers and others who 
propagate cultural knowledge.117 
Instead we need a more nuanced approach in which we recognise that only those 
who were very familiar with Chrysostom’s preaching and with the more in-depth 
teaching of Christian concepts would have grasped Chrysostom’s words as he intended 
and have understood that the very material image of God/Christ provided here was 
meant to reveal sublime truths about the transcendental God. For this group, their 
literal indoctrination would, on the one hand, make it easier for them to override the 
cognitive predisposition to favouring more intuitive and anthropomorphic conceptions 
of God and, on the other hand, mean that their existing cultural knowledge would 
support rather than contradict what Chrysostom was trying to say. For others, however, 
who attended Chrysostom’s preaching less regularly, who had not been catechised and 
who generally had far less knowledge of formal Christian teachings, the active role of 
the receiving minds, the tenacity of existing knowledge and the tendency to fall back on 
intuitive, theologically incorrect conceptions of divinity that we heard about in the 
previous section would have had an impact on their understanding. Chrysostom’s 
anthropomorphising image of Christ/God the King who moved through space from one 
location to another would fit well with the kind of simplified images that many audience 
members would have themselves made and used in online reasoning and that they 
would have found easier to comprehend, memorise and transmit. The difficulty human 
minds have in grasping highly counterintuitive concepts of the divine would in turn act 
as a cognitive constraint that prevented them from using this image as a bridge to a 
more transcendental conception of God that Chrysostom was trying to get across as part 
of his teaching on the incarnation.118 We could thus argue, that it is likely that after 
hearing this passage some at least in Chrysostom’s audiences would have had their 
intuitive, unreflective, less theologically correct conception of God reinforced rather 
than challenged. 
However, as we saw at the end of the previous section, it is not enough to focus 
only on universal, human tendencies and constraints; we also need to take account of 
the full range of knowledge a human being might hold in their head when they listen to 
verbal discourse.119 Thus the fact that Chrysostom’s audiences would have blended, in 
Mark Turner’s sense, the image he created of God/Christ as king with their existing 
knowledge suggests a further way in which their understanding of the incarnation and 
of God would have diverged from what Chrysostom intended. We cannot know anything 
about the personal knowledge on which members of Chrysostom’s audiences might 
have drawn, or even how groups based on class and gender might have responded 
 
117 On the importance of the minds and mental processes of the members of Chrysostom’s audiences, see 
also Stenger, “Text Worlds and Imagination”: “The preaching situation was more than a social 
interaction… [T]he synaxis was a mental construct that was produced through textual strategies… .” 
118 As Gervais et al. put it, summarising the work of Barrett and Nyhof, “the presence of mildly counter-
intuitive content in concepts or narratives can bias memory in a manner that would favour such concepts 
or narratives in cultural evolution.” Will M. Gervais et al., “The Cultural Transmission of Faith: Why Innate 
Intuitions are Necessary, But Insufficient, to Explain Religious Belief,” Religion 41.3 (2011): 394, on Justin 
L. Barrett and Melanie A. Nyhof, “Spreading Nonnatural Concepts: The Role of Intuitive Conceptual 
Structures in Memory and Transmission of Cultural Materials,” JCognCult 1 (2001): 69–100.  
119 On the importance of the existing knowledge of the members of Chrysostom’s audiences, see also 
Stenger, “Text World and Imagination.” On the question of the extent to which the impact of Chrysostom’s 
homilies on his listeners can be thought of in terms of human universals as opposed to cultural specifics, 
see also Mayer, “Preaching Hatred” in this volume. 
  
 
differently to what Chrysostom says—at least not with the evidence available to us.120 
However, we can say something about some more general widely shared kinds of 
cultural knowledge that might have had an impact on how some at least in Chrysostom’s 
audiences might have received what he said.121 For example, it seems likely that many 
in Chrysostom’s audiences would still have been familiar with Homeric texts from 
formal education, from the theatre and from stories told to them when children. I would 
thus argue that when many audience members listened to Chrysostom’s description of 
God jumping up from his throne and coming down to earth to “stand in the battle array,” 
they would have thought of the numerous occasions in the Iliad where one of the 
Olympian gods comes down to earth from Olympus or heaven to intervene in human 
affairs, especially battle scenes. Thus we hear that “Zeus came down from heaven,” that 
Apollo strode down from Olympus and that “down from the peaks of Olympus [Athena] 
went darting.”122 Once they are in the human world, these gods and divinities often 
joined in the human fighting on one side or the other. Thus we have Apollo helping the 
Trojans by fighting against Patroclus,123 or we have Poseidon helping Achilles against 
Aeneas,124 or we have Apollo attacking the Greeks.125 
I would argue that Chrysostom could not control how all his audience members 
actually received what he said and that those who had better knowledge of the stories 
of the Homeric poems than they did of the Bible, or of Christian doctrine, might well 
have used these Homeric stories to a far greater degree when they built their own 
mental representations of God/Christ leaping down to the earthly world from heaven to 
fight for human salvation. When Chrysostom spoke to them about the incarnate Christ, 
they might actually have thought of Apollo or Zeus, or at the very least they would have 
held rather odd images of Christ in which Christian and Homeric/Graeco-Roman 
elements were blended together. This supports the finding from cognitive science 
outlined in the previous section of the power of existing knowledge and of the difficulty 
of transforming how people think. Chrysostom could thus be said to have doubly failed 
at his goal of teaching the incarnation in that some of them at least might both be more 
likely to see Christ/God in anthropomorphic terms and be more likely to fall back on 
Graeco-Roman conceptions of divinity that were still prevalent in society at the time. 
However, to see such “misunderstandings” in negative terms is to miss the point. 
In my revised model they are what allowed Chrysostom’s words to have any impact at 
all on his listeners because they constituted images made in the minds of the audiences 
that were related to their own existing cultural knowledge, and thus properly 
comprehended by those listening to them, and were images that were more natural and 
 
120 The cognitive science used in this chapter explores principles that apply to all “cognitively modern” 
human minds and does not concern itself with the way gender and class might accept thought processes 
because these are socio-cultural rather than mental factors. This does not mean these differences weren’t 
there or that I don’t think them to be important. It simply means that the methodology I am presenting in 
this chapter cannot help us to reach them. 
121 From heaven, see Homer, Il. 1.190–95 and 11.180–85. From Olympus, see Il. 1.40–50, 2.165, 15.145–
50, 22.185–90 and 24.120–30. For Mount Ida, see Il. 13.15–25, 15.235 and 16.665–75. For gods fighting 
alongside mortals, see Il. 6.698–75, 20.319–30, 21.142–54.  
122 Il. 11.180–85, 21.142-54 and 2.165. See also Il. 1.190–95 and 11.180–85, 1.40–50, 2.165, 15.145–50, 
22.185–90 and 24.120–30. On other occasions, one of the gods is already in the human world on Mount 
Ida and then moves down from there to where the human action is taking place (Il. 13.15–25; 16.665–75; 
15.235). 
123 Il. 6.698-75. 
124 Il. 20.319-30. 
125 Il. 21.142-54. For the gods getting involved in the battle in slightly less direct ways, see also Il. 22.225; 
21.545; 11.70–80. 
  
 
intuitive than theological concepts and so a better fit with their cognitive 
predispositions and more easy for them to memorise, make inferences from, use and 
transmit. This gave a normally complex theological Christian concept a chance to 
compete with the intuitive, anthropomorphic divine concepts of Graeco-Roman religion, 
which otherwise would have had a clear cognitive advantage.126  
 
4 Final Words: The Way Forward 
 
The vivid language that Chrysostom uses to depict God and Christ in the first two 
homilies on Matthew make it easier than it often is to apply cognitive theory to his 
words and to reconstruct audience receptions of what he said. This passage is also 
striking for the way it tries to teach a key lesson about a theological concept that was 
the subject of heated debate at the time.127 However, I would argue that we can make 
similar points about every occasion where Chrysostom uses analogy with human 
figures to describe God/Christ, even if the descriptions he gives are less detailed. So for 
example, in early homilies of the longer series on Genesis Chrysostom repeatedly 
compares God’s acts of creation with the activities of human craftsmen and builders. 
Thus of Genesis 1:1 (“In the beginning God made heaven and earth”) he says: 
 
But why mention God’s creation? Even human arts germane to them are beyond 
them. Tell me, for instance, how the substance of gold takes shape through the art 
of mining? Or how the purity of glass comes from sand? … So if [you can’t explain] 
the things which human wisdom devises, thanks to God’s loving kindness, why 
busy yourself, mere mortal, about the things created by God?128 
 
Or of Genesis 1:4 (“God saw that the light was good”) he says: 
 
Is it that before the light comes into being he does not know it is beautiful, whereas 
after its appearance the sight of it shows its creator the beauty of what appears? 
What sort of sense would this make? I mean, if a man works at some piece of 
craftsmanship, and before he completes the thing he is making and puts final 
touches to it he sees the use to which he will put the thing he is making, how much 
 
126 However, as the work of Gervais and his colleagues makes clear, while having concepts of a natural 
and intuitive nature is necessary for explaining the success of a particular religion, such “content biases” 
cannot completely explain that success. As they put it, the nature of the religious concepts themselves 
cannot answer the question of why “belief in God is a powerful force in the world today, and discussion of 
Zeus is relegated to mythology classes” or why people believe in some divinities but not others despite 
being able to represent both (Will M. Gervais and Joseph Henrich, “The Zeus Problem: Why 
Representational Content Biases Cannot Explain Faith in Gods,” JCognCult 10 [2010]: 383–89; see also 
Gervais et al., “Cultural Transmission”). Instead we also need to take account of “context biases,” the 
various cultural supports that are given to the dominant beliefs in that culture including the prevalence of 
a belief, the favouring of a belief by those who are “older, skilled, prestigious and successful,” and use of 
“credibility enhancing displays,” to support the belief (Gervais et al., “Cultural Transmission,” 392). This 
allows room for more typical historical explanations such as support from the emperor and his court and 
from increasingly influential Christian leaders, the growing numbers of Christians, and the displays of 
adherence to Christianity as seen in the behaviours of Christian ascetics. For a more comprehensive 
critique of the way cognitive science ignores issues of belief and cultural traditions, see van Slyke, 
Cognitive Science. 
127 In future work I hope to explore further how common such methods for teaching the incarnation are in 
Chrysostom and how they compare with other methods he uses to teach this doctrine. 
128 In Gen. hom. 2.6 (PG 53.28.37–45). 
  
 
more the creator of all, who by his word brings into being everything from non-
being, sees that the light is good before he creates it… This blessed author speaks 
out of considerateness for the way humans speak and just as people work on 
something with great care, and when they bring their efforts to completion they 
parade what they have made for scrutiny and commendation…129 
 
His purpose is to show how much more amazing God’s acts of creation are than these 
human acts, but I would argue the human predisposition to conceive of God in 
anthropomorphic terms explored above would mean that in fact his words in these 
homilies would have had the opposite effect and caused people to imagine a human-like 
God creating the world out of pre-existing materials.130   
There are also occasions when it seems to me that the knowledge that members 
of Chrysostom’s audiences held in their minds would have prevented them from 
interpreting scripture as he wanted them to. Again in the Genesis homilies, there is the 
example of the way in which Chrysostom deals with the timing of the creation of the sun 
in the creation narrative. According to Genesis 5:14 God didn’t create the sun until day 
four, after the creation of the crops. Chrysostom tells his audiences that the reason for 
this is that God wanted it to be clear that the sun was not “responsible for the 
germination of the crops” so that they did not assign too much power to the sun and 
treat it as a deity.131 The trouble is that the way Chrysostom teaches his audiences about 
the first four days of creation can be seen to undermine this purpose because he doesn’t 
explicitly clarify that the sun has not yet been created until homily five.132 For cognitive 
science, understanding verbal discourse means relating it to our existing knowledge, 
and human minds tend to assume that scenarios described in literature are like those 
that they are familiar with until they are told otherwise.133 Given this, I would argue that 
members of Chrysostom’s audiences would have assumed the sun was created at the 
same time as the heavens, as described in Genesis 1:1, because this is what they were 
familiar with from their own world. Why would they conceive of the skies without the 
sun in it when Chrysostom had given them no explicit instruction to do so? Surely they 
would have imagined that the sun was there right from the start and, in fact, there are a 
number of other points in Genesis which might reinforce the idea that the sun was 
already present. So the line “God said: Let there be light”134 could again suggest the 
presence of the sun creating the light, and the repeated line “evening came and morning 
came”135 to describe the progress of each day is hard to conceptualise, and so hard to 
understand, without thinking of human experiences of night turning into day with the 
 
129 In Gen. hom. 3.9-10 (PG 53.35.1–17). For other examples, see In Gen. hom. 2.11 (PG 53.30.15–25); 
hom. 2.12 (PG 53.31.1–17); hom. 4.11 (PG 53.43.45–44.1).  
130 The literature on the power of metaphors, including analogy, and their important role in cognitive 
processes and understanding is large. Mayer, “Preaching Hatred” in this volume, summarises the debates 
and provides an introduction to the literature. She agrees that the role of such metaphors should be seen 
as far more than simple decoration or commonplaces. 
131 In Gen. hom. 5.12 (PG 53.52.1–2) and hom. 6.12 (PG 53.58.15–35). 
132 Cf. Basil of Caesarea’s approach to the problem. Basil uses the second line of Genesis as an occasion to 
clarify exactly which features of the familiar world were created and which not in God’s very first creative 
act and says explicitly that the heavens “were not lighted around by the moon or the sun” yet (Basil, Hom. 
Hex. 2.1). 
133 Gavins, Text World Theory, 10. 
134 In Gen. hom. 3.5 (PG.53.34.1–3). 
135 In Gen. hom. 3.11, 4.14 and 5.14 (PG 53.35.36-7, 45.9-10 and 52c.38-9). 
  
 
rising sun, in which the sun figures strongly.136 This was a problem for Chrysostom 
because if the sun was present from the start of creation in the understanding of those 
in his audience, what was to prevent them from also imagining it to have a role in the 
growth of crops just as they saw it to have in their own world and thus, in turn, to 
attribute divine power to it? It could thus be argued that here too, the existing 
knowledge of Chrysostom’s audiences would have prevented at least some of them from 
conceiving of God and his power as he wished and actually reinforced Graeco-Roman 
conceptions of divinity that Chrysostom was trying to erase and replace.  
These are, of course, all isolated passages and more work needs to be done 
identifying other similar passages and assessing how common they are in Chrysostom’s 
preaching. It will continue to be very hard to say much in detail about audience 
receptions of Chrysostom’s preaching and, as we have seen, cognitive science can only 
provide us with limited help. However, I think we have shown that cognitive science, 
and alternative theories of what counts as good communication, provide us with enough 
ammunition to argue that we do need to shift scholarly assumptions about the way 
Chrysostom’s preaching works and the likely impact that it had so that we can allow 
ourselves to see points where he might have failed in his explicit intentions or where his 
words might have unintended consequences. At the same time, what we have found can 
also cautiously be used to suggest an alternate model of how Christianity spread so 
successfully than is usually adopted. We can argue that Christianity’s success was not so 
much a result of the fact that its key theologically correct ideas were being transmitted 
exactly as they were taught by Christian leaders, but rather was a result of the way the 
human minds of lay Christians created their own varied, more intuitive, and more easily 
transmittable conceptions of those ideas, and latched on to such images when they 
heard them from their preacher. In this model, Christianity did not ultimately succeed 
because it engaged in a Platonic-style dialogue with an audience who understood 
everything as Christian preachers intended or because it created a “totalizing discourse” 
shared by all Christians. Rather, it succeeded because the intentions of Christian 
preachers failed and because preachers could not control exactly how lay Christians 
heard what they said. Preaching should thus be seen as a form of mass communication 
to those who received it with active minds according to universal cognitive constraints 
and by blending it with the cultural and personal knowledge existing in their minds, and 
that this was precisely the reason it was successful, because this is how true 
communication and comprehension are defined.  
  
 
136 For the first example, we can again give some comparison with Basil. His interpretation of the line “Let 
there be light” does not explicitly state that there was no sun yet, but it does describe in great detail how 
the whole body of air that made up the heavens became infused with light (Basil, Hom. Hex. 2.6). This 
would have made it much easier for his audiences to understand how there could be light in the heavens 
without the sun. 
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